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At the time of London’s bid to host 
the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 
2012 the cost of the Games was 
estimated to be just over £4 billion. 
The costs were to be met by public 
sector funding of £3.4 billion, with a 
further £738 million from the private 
sector. 
 
After London was awarded the 
Games, the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport DCMS) and the 
Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) 
reviewed the cost estimates and in 
March 2007 announced a revised, 
and much higher, budget of £9.325 
billion. The DCMS currently report 
(Nov 2009) that Games preparations 
in all areas are currently on time and 
on budget, including the extensive 
transport infrastructure 
improvements being made to the 
Docklands Light Railway (DLR), the 
redevelopment of the Stratford 
Regional Station and the successful 
completion of the test of the seven-
minute Javelin service.  
 
This case study presents the rationale 
for the substantially increased 
revised figures, and asks why the 
initial budget was so inaccurate. This 
case study may be of particular 
interest to those studying event 
planning or business related topics. 
 
N.B. The statistics and financial information that follow 
are taken from the House of Commons Committee of 
Public Accounts report: The budget for the London 2012 
Olympic and Paralympic Games Fourteenth Report of 
Session 2007–08 (published April 2008), and London 
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games – Quarterly 
Economic Reports (up to November 2009). 
 
Contingency Planning 
The March 2007 budget included contingency 
provision of £2.747 billion. This sum was not 
included at the time of the bid, despite 
Treasury guidance that budgets for all major 
projects should allow for a tendency to 
underestimate costs. Such an underestimation 
is clear within the context of the London 2012 
bid.  As of Nov 2009, the gross allocation of 
contingency on the project to date was 
£702m, leaving a balance of £1,270m 
available.  
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Taxation Issues 
£500million of the contingency funds had to 
be allocated to coverage of ‘early financial 
pressures’ and to cover £836 million in 
taxation payments to the earlier cost 
estimates, as these tax figures had not been 
included in the original budget. These funds 
also covered an estimated extra £600m 
budget for policing and security, a figure that 
had not been budgeted for in the original bid. 
The ODA’s programme delivery budget also 
rose to £570m from the original figure of just 
£16 million. 
 
Effects of the Credit Crunch 
The public funding required to cover these 
increased costs now stands at an extra £5.9 
billion, due in large part to a significant 
reduction in the level of private sector funding 
than was first thought possible. Some £4.9 
billion of this increase is to be met by the 
Exchequer and £675 million by the National 
Lottery, bringing the total Lottery contribution 
to £2.175bn.  
Land Sale 
Post-Games disposal/sale of Olympic assets 
will determine whether some of the costs to 
the public can be recouped (most likely via 
sale of Olympic land).  
 
 
Private Sector Investment 
At the time of the bid, private sector funding 
stood at an estimate of £738m. This figure 
was revised to £165m by 2008 (less than 2% 
of the total funding). Alarmingly, the Olympic 
Village had been expected to be completely 
funded by the private sector, but the 
Government have now allocated £175m 
public funds to the project. 
 
Revised budget = revised legacy? 
The legacy impact of the Games, most 
specifically to the regeneration of East 
London, cannot be achieved without adequate 
financial investment. The ramifications of 
revising the budget puts more pressure on the 
public sector and may compromise the legacy 
and vision of the Games. One is now invited to 
consider the most significant financial 
ramifications of poor financial bid 
management on the Games themselves and 
on the public sector who have now had to 
shoulder the bulk of the spiralling costs. 
 
The fact that foreseeable requirements for 
public sector funding were excluded from the 
estimates at the time of the bid is a valid and 
ongoing concern.  
£500m (18%) of the programme 
contingency had already been spent by 
2008.  
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Why did this occur? Was it simply poor 
management? This gave an unrealistic picture 
of the costs that the public sector needed to 
meet in order for the Games to be held in 
London. 
 
Contrary to good practice, the Department did 
not budget for a programme contingency 
(£2.7 bn). This is because the scale and 
complexity of the project was simply not 
appreciated at the time of the bid.  
 
The costs of tax and security bill now stands at 
£1.4bn but was not even considered in the 
original bid. 
 
The revised public sector funding package of 
£9.325bn does not include all of the activities 
on which delivery of the Games and its legacy 
depends.  Crucially, it does not include 
acquisition of land for the Olympic Park, wider 
transport link costs and the cost of Govt 
depts. Involved in the Games. Such costs need 
to be calculated into the final economic 
impact figures for the Games. 
 
Despite the £5.9bn increase in the public 
funding for the Games, specific assurances of 
delivery based on return for this expenditure 
and the current budget cannot be reconciled 
to the commitments in the original bid.  
 
Clearly, transparency and accountability of 
all financial decisions is required. The 
Department should provide:  
 a statement of what will be 
delivered, including the legacy plans 
and 
 benefits for the programme as a 
whole; 
 provide an assessment of progress 
against that baseline in its annual 
reports to Parliament; and 
 show how any subsequent changes 
to the plans reconcile to the baseline 
 and support them with a clear audit 
trail. 
Significant revisions for private sector 
contributions have increased the estimated 
burden of the public sector to £748m.  
 
In addition to increased financial burdens 
placed on the public sector, further burden 
may have to be shouldered as the absence of 
legacy plans is making it harder to attract 
private investment. Estimated private sector 
contribution has fallen by £573m. Selling off 
Olympic land after the Games to private 
investors may make up some ground in 
recouping public funds.  
 
The Department has confirmed that the 
public sector funding of £9.325bn will not 
be exceeded and the Committee will hold 
the Department to account against this 
figure.  Overall, a total of 10,500 people have 
been employed on the Olympic Park since 
April 2008. During that period on average 
one in five of the construction workforce 
have been local people from the five Host 
Boroughs. 30,000 workers will be 
employed on the Olympic site over the 
lifetime of the build   
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The National Lottery is providing £2.175 bn 
(23%) of Olympic funding, but the estimated 
£675m reimbursement is reliant on the sale of 
property to the private sector after the 
Games.  
 
The Department is aiming for wide ranging 
legacy benefits from the Games, but there is 
no basis on which to measure achievements.  
 
Any well-designed project should have 
designed an impact study to measure the 
impact of their programme. No such study 
exists for the Olympic Games in terms of 
measuring legacy.  
 
Possible Explanations for the Discrepancy in 
the Original Bid 
The DCMS denied that it had deliberately 
excluded costs from the original bid 
document, in order to help win the Games. It 
instead claimed that bid estimates had been 
prepared at a time when it was not certain 
that the Games would be awarded to London, 
that the Olympic land was not yet in public 
ownership and detailed plans for the venues 
had not been drawn up; thus, it would have 
been impossible to gain a complete and 
accurate picture of the overall budget for the 
Games. This did not, however, explain why 
apparently basic forecasts associated with 
contingency planning, wider transport links 
and security provisions had not been 
considered when it would have fallen well 
within the capabilities of a competent event 
planning team to do so. The DCMS 
nevertheless strongly refuted the possibility 
that their intention had been to deceive 
anyone. 
 
HM Treasury guidance recommends that 
budgets for major projects include a 
contingency to allow for optimism bias (that 
is, the tendency for the costs of projects to be 
underestimated). Clearly, optimism bias 
played a role in the London Olympic bid.    
Following a detailed and quantified risk 
analysis, the DCMS and ODA considered that 
the new level of financial funding for 
contingency planning was now prudent and 
realistic, but that the biggest risks remained as 
the immovable deadline of the Games, and 
the avoidance of cost escalation at the end of 
the programme. This would include possible 
inflationary risks such as construction price 
inflation. 
 
One of the largest potential explanations for 
poor financial forecasting might be explained 
by confusion over taxation status.  
 
Following HM Treasury confirmation that the 
ODA would, in fact, not be eligible to reclaim 
The largest single increase in the original 
bid was the £2,747m provision for 
programme contingency. 
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VAT, tax liabilities of £1,173m had to be 
accounted for in a revised budget. 
 
The insubstantial budget allocated to the 
provision of security remains a confusing 
issue. It is unclear why, in today’s political and 
social environment, the threat of security 
violations and terrorism could not have been 
taken more seriously from a financial point of 
view by the London bid team. Whilst it is true 
that original security estimates included £190 
m for site security during construction (a 
figure which increased to £268m in the March 
2007 budget), this figure nevertheless rose 
exponentially to include an extra £600m for 
policing and wider security A further £238m 
was also provided for security funding in the 
contingency fund for the project 
 
How the Credit Crunch Has Affected Funding 
for the Games 
Perceptions relating to the effects of the 
economic crisis are mixed, with some 
observers praising the DCMS and ODA for on 
time and under budget delivery of central 
aspects of the Olympic build, with transport, 
stadia and overall construction only a 
reported 4 days behind schedule. The 
recessionary impact on inflation has positively 
impacted the Olympic budget by driving down 
construction materials costs.   
 
The effects of the economic crisis have 
detrimentally effected development of the 
Games, as no private sector funding could be 
secured for development of the Media Centre 
or Olympic Village. The DCMS and ODA have 
been forced to siphon funds form the 
contingency fund (never a part of the original 
bid) to finance these developments In 
addition, the ODA were forced to write-off a 
further £12.5m caused by the collapse of a 
deal with contractors Lend Lease (£5m) and 
media centre design that could not be 
completed due to inadequate investment 
(£7.5m). Despite such financial difficulties, the 
ODA have been criticised for significantly 
raising bonuses paid to external consultants 
during this period.   
 
It is possible that smaller sports might fare the 
worst; whilst cycling and rowing have been 
allocated combined funding of £54m in the 
run up to the 2012 Games, smaller sports will 
receive a fraction of this. For example,  
 
SnowSport GB, the official governing body for 
snow and ski sports, received only £800,000.  
 
Both Summer and Winter sports have been hit 
with funding cuts as a result of the recession. 
 
The Olympic Effect 
Economists often voice scepticism about the 
economic benefits of hosting ‘mega-events’ 
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such as the Olympic Games. Their rationale 
for such scepticism rests on the fact that such 
as event appears to entail considerable costs 
to the public, yet appear to yield few tangible 
benefits. Regardless, one might observe that 
policy-makers and the population of a country 
(if informed correctly about the financial 
pressures that are likely to be exerted on the 
public purse strings, presumably!) tend to 
remain enthusiastic about such an event.  
 
Rose & Spiegel (2009) attempted to reconcile 
these positions by examining the economic 
impact of hosting mega-events such as the 
Olympics for the host country. It was found 
that hosting a mega-event such as the 
Olympic Games exerted a statistically 
significant and positive impact on national 
exports, which is permanent in nature, and of  
notable size; trade appears to be around 30% 
higher for countries that have hosted the 
Olympics when compared to those that have 
not. Interestingly, however, the effect of a 
country bidding for the Games (regardless of 
success) appears to exert a very similar 
economic impact, on exports, leading to a 
conclusion that the ‘Olympic effect’ on trade 
is attributable to the signal a country to others 
when bidding to host the games (in terms of 
political, economic and financial stability), 
rather than the act of actually holding the 
mega-event for which it bid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIND OUT MORE 
House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts report: The budget for the London 
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games 
Fourteenth Report of Session 2007–08 
(published April 2008) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/c
m200708/cmselect/cmpubacc/85/85.pdf  
The Olympic Effect. Andrew K Rose, Mark M 
Spiegel:  
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14854  
 
 
 
London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games 
– Quarterly Economic Reports (up to 
November 2009).  Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/reference_library/
publications/6454.aspx  
London 2012: Stuck on the blocks? Progress 
on construction is good, but there are doubts 
over the Olympics' legacy and worries over 
security. Merrick, J. The Independent on 
Sunday. Sunday, 19 July 2009 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/hom
e-news/london-2012-stuck-on-the-blocks-
1752291.html 
 HLST Learning Legacies: Case Study – February 2010 7 
Case Study 
THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF THE 2012 GAMES    
CREDITS 
© Oxford Brookes University 2010. oxb:060111:010cs 
 
This resource was produced as part of the 2012 Learning Legacies Project managed by  the HEA 
Hospitality, Leisure, Sport and Tourism Subject Centre at Oxford Brookes University and was released 
as an Open Educational Resource. The project was funded by HEFCE and part of the JISC/HE Academy 
UKOER programme. Except where otherwise noted above and below, this work is released under a 
Creative Commons Attribution only licence.  
 
 
Exceptions to the Licence 
The name of Oxford Brookes University and the Oxford Brookes University logo are the name and 
registered marks of Oxford Brookes University. To the fullest extent permitted by law Oxford Brookes 
University reserves all its rights in its name and marks, which may not be used except with its written 
permission.  
 
The JISC logo is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No 
Derivative Works 2.0 UK: England & Wales Licence.  All reproductions must comply with the terms of 
that licence.  
 
The Higher Education Academy logo and the HEA Hospitality, Leisure, Sport and Tourism Subject 
Centre logo are owned by the Higher Education Academy Limited and may be freely distributed and 
copied for educational purposes only, provided that appropriate acknowledgement is given to the 
Higher Education Academy as the copyright holder and original publisher. 
 
          
 
Reusing this work 
To refer to or reuse parts of this work please include the copyright notice above including the serial 
number. The only exception is if you intend to only reuse a part of the work with its own specific 
copyright notice, in which case cite that. 
 
If you create a new piece of work based on the original (at least in part), it will help other users to find 
your work if you modify and reuse this serial number. When you reuse this work, edit the serial 
number by choosing 3 letters to start (your initials or institutional code are good examples), change 
the date section (between the colons) to your creation date in ddmmyy format and retain the last 5 
digits from the original serial number. Make the new serial number your copyright declaration or add 
it to an existing one, e.g. ‘abc:101011:010cs’. 
 
If you create a new piece of work or do not wish to link a new work with any existing materials 
contained within, a new code should be created. Choose your own 3-letter code, add the creation 
date and search as below on Google with a plus sign at the start, e.g. ‘+tom:030504’.   If nothing 
comes back citing this code then add a new 5-letter code of your choice to the end, e.g.; ‘:01lex’, and 
do a final search for the whole code. If the search returns a positive result, make up a new 5-letter 
code and try again. Add the new code your copyright declaration or add it to an existing one.
 
 
 
 
